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NOTES
ATTORNEY'S FEES IN A 905(b) ACTION:
THE LONGSHOREMAN COMES UP SHORT
William Bloomer, a longshoreman,1 was injured during the
course of his employment and received compensation from his em-
ployer, a stevedore. After receiving compensation payments,
Bloomer brought a third-party action against the shipowner pur-
suant to section 905(b)2 of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act.' Under the LHWCA, the longshoreman's recov-
ery is subject to a lien in favor of the stevedore in the amount of his
compensation payments. Asserting that Congress had altered the
equities when it amended the LHWCA in 1972, Bloomer contended
that the lien should be reduced by an amount which would represent
the stevedore's proportionate share of the expenses of the 905(b) ac-
tion against the shipowner. The district court denied petitioner's
motion, and the court of appeals affirmed. Acknowledging that the
courts of appeals were divided on the issue of whether the steve-
dore should bear a portion of the legal expenses, the Supreme Court
granted certiorari. The Court held that the language, structure, and
history of the Act indicate a congressional unwillingness to create a
liability on the part of the stevedore in the form of a charge for the
longshoreman's legal expenses. Bloomer v. Liberty Mutual In-
surance Company, 100 S. Ct. 925 (1980).
In order to appreciate fully the impact and significance of the
1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
1. In the instant case, the parties involved are a stevedore and a longshoreman.
It is important to note, however, that the case and the following discussion apply with
equal force to all maritime workers and maritime employers covered by the
Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (1978).
2. 33 U.S.C.A. § 905(b) (1978) states:
In the event of injury to a person covered under this chapter caused by the
negligence of a vessel, then such persons, or anyone otherwise entitled to recover
damages by reason thereof, may bring an action against such vessel as a third
party in accordance with the provisions of section 933 of this title, and the
employer shall not be liable to the vessel for such damages directly or indirectly
and any agreements or warranties to the contrary shall be void. If such person
was employed by the vessel to provide stevedoring services, no such action shall
be permitted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in
providing stevedoring services to the vessel. If such person was employed by the
vessel to provide ship building or repair services, no such action shall be permit-
ted if the injury was caused by the negligence of persons engaged in providing
ship building or repair services to the vessel. The liability of the vessel under this
subsection shall not be based upon the warranty of seaworthiness or a breach
thereof at the time the injury occurred. The remedy provided in this subsection
shall be exclusive of all other remedies against the vessel except remedies
available under this chapter.
3. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-50 (1978),
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Compensation Act, it is necessary to be aware of the situation that
existed prior to those amendments. The Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act of 1927 was enacted largely in response
to the failure to provide coverage for maritime employees through
existing state compensation systems. The Supreme Court had refused,
on constitutional grounds, to allow state compensation systems to in-
clude persons injured on navigable waters.' Although the 1927 Act
had attempted to limit the liability of the stevedore-employer to the
compensation and medical payments provided in the Act, the
Supreme Court frustrated this congressional purpose5 in the Seas
Shipping Company v. Sieracki and Ryan Stevedoring Company v.
Pan Atlantic Steamship Corp.7 cases.
In Sieracki, the Court gave the longshoreman the benefit of a
warranty of seaworthiness in suits against the shipowner. This war-
ranty of seaworthiness facilitated the longshoreman's recovery since
fault did not need to be proved; the warranty of seaworthiness
amounted to imposing upon the vessel owner a "species of liability
without fault."8 Then, in Ryan, the Court asserted that the
shipowner could recover from the stevedore-employer whatever he
had paid to the longshoreman by virtue of a breach of the
stevedore's warranty of workmanlike performance The Sieracki-
Ryan system "violated the congressional intent in passing the Act
[which was] to limit the employer's liability for compensation."'"
Under the Sieracki-Ryan system, the injured maritime worker could
recover full tort damages, as distinguished from the limited benefits
provided under a compensation system. The 1972 Amendments elim-
inated both the longshoreman's unseaworthiness remedy and the
right of the shipowner to shift the entire burden to the stevedore
through the stevedore's warranty of workmanlike performance.11
One of the goals of the drafters of the 905(b) provision was to "con-
4. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
5. See Steinberg, The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act: Negligence Actions by Longshoremen Against Ship-
owners-A Proposed Solution, 4 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION L. REV. 653, 659 (1978).
6. 328 U.S. 85 (1946).
7. 350 U.S. 124 (1956).
8. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 449 (2d ed. 1975).
9. Note, Admiralty-Maritime Personal Injury and Death-Longshoremen's and
Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972, 47 TUL. L. REV. 1151, 1152
(1973).
10. Id. at 1152.
11. Robertson, Jurisdiction, Shipowner Negligence and Stevedore Immunities
under the 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's Act, 4 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
L. REV. 435, 436 (1978).
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sign the thousands of Sieracki-Ryan harbor worker cases to the
scrapheap.""
Although the longshoreman may no longer bring an action
against the shipowner based upon a warranty of seaworthiness, he
still may bring a 905(b) action based upon negligence against the
third party shipowner. Furthermore, the longshoreman need not
choose between the receipt of compensation payments and the abil-
ity to recover damages for negligence.'" Since 1959, these altern-
atives have not been mutually exclusive." If the longshoreman suc-
cessfully proceeds against the shipowner under section 905(b), por-
tions of the recovery will be claimed not only by the longshoreman,
but also by his attorney and the stevedore-employer. If the recovery
is sufficient to pay adequately all of the parties involved, there is no
difficulty. A conflict between the three parties arises only when the
recovery against the shipowner is insufficient to cover both the
maritime employer's lien and the attorney's lien or is barely suffi-
cient, so that there is little left for the employee. An attempt will be
made to highlight this conflict, to place it in perspective, and to sug-
gest an equitable solution.
At the outset, it can be noted that the various circuits have
resolved this problem inconsistently. Part of the reason for this lack
of consistency is the fact that Congress has failed to specify how the
recovery should be distributed when the 905(b) action is initiated by
the longshoreman,'5 although section 933(e) of the LHWCA specifically
provides a distribution scheme when the 905(b) action is initiated by
the stevedore.'6 Under section 933(b) the longshoreman has six months
12. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8, at 437. Other changes affected by the
amendments include an increase in the compensation benefits, an expansion of the
geographical coverage, and the creation of a new system of adjudication for disputed
compensation cases. Although the above mentioned changes are significant, the focus
in this article will be upon the elimination of the warranties system and the remaining
action against the shipowner for negligence. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 436.
13. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(a) (1978).
14. Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of
1959, Pub. L. No. 86-171, 73 Stat. 391.
15. Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappy Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274, 1280 (5th
Cir. 1978).
16. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(e) (1978) provides:
Any amount recovered by such employer on account of such assignment,
whether or not as the result of a compromise, shall be distributed as follows:
(1) The employer shall retain an amount equal to-
(A) the expenses incurred by him in respect to such proceedings or com-
promise (including a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the deputy
commissioner or Board);
(B) the cost of all benefits actually furnished by him to the employee
under section 907 of this title;
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to assert his 905(b) action against the third party shipowner. Should
the longshoreman fail to do so within this period, the stevedore is
assigned the longshoreman's right of action. 7 If such an assignment
occurs and if the stevedore successfully asserts his claim, he is en-
titled to recover everything that he paid to the employee as compen-
sation and all of his costs, including attorney's fees; in addition, he
may retain one-fifth of the excess. 8 The statute does not, however,
provide such a distribution scheme when the longshoreman initiates
the 905(b) action. Congressional silence in this area has led to a
diversity of opinion among the various circuit courts.
The ninth circuit in Bachtel v. Mammoth Bulk Carriers, Ltd.9
adopted the pro rata approach of the fourth circuit. The fourth cir-
cuit had determined in Swift v. Bolten ° that "the stevedore should
be taxed with that part of a reasonable fee for the longshoreman's
counsel as is proportioned to its share of the recovery.""1 Declaring
that the pro rata approach was both easy to apply and equitable, the
Bachtel court followed the reasoning of Swift. Both courts recognized
the fact that the prior conflict of interests between the longshoreman
and the stevedore was practically abolished by the 1972 Amend-
ments. Prior to 1972, the stevedore should not have been required to
contribute to the attorney's fees when, due to the circuity of litiga-
tion, the stevedore himself eventually would be sued by the
shipowner. After 1972 the triangular lawsuit that existed when the
(C) all amounts paid as compensation;
(D) the present value of all amounts thereafter payable as compensation,
such present value to be computed in accordance with a schedule prepared
by the secretary, and the present value of the cost of all benefits thereafter
to be furnished under section 907 of this title, to be estimated by the deputy
commissioner, and the amount so computed and estimated to be retained by
the employer as a trust fund to pay such compensation and the cost of such
benefits as they become due, and to pay any sum finally remaining in the ex-
cess thereof to the person entitled to compensation or the representative;
and
(2) The employer shall pay any excess to the person entitled to compensation
or to the representative, less one-fifth of such excess which shall belong to the
employer.
17. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(b) (1978) states:
Acceptance of such compensation under an award in a compensation order filed
by the deputy commissioner or Board shall operate as an assignment to the
employer of all right of the person entitled to compensation to recover damages
against such third person unless such person shall commence an action against
such third person within six months after such award.
18. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(e) (1978).
19. 605 F.2d 438 (9th Cir. 1979).
20. 517 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1975).
21. Id. at 370.
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shipowner compensated the longshoreman, only to recoup the com-
pensation from the stevedore, was no longer possible. Thus, both the
longshoreman and the stevedore now have a common interest in ob-
taining a recovery from the shipowner. It was this reasoning that led
the Bachtel and the Swift courts to apportion the attorney's fees be-
tween the stevedore and the longshoreman.
In contrast to the pro rata scheme, the second circuit employed
the "fund rule" to distribute the amount recovered from a third party.
The court was faced with a curious situation in Valentino v.
Rickners Rhederei, G.m.B.H.;22 the recovery from the shipowner was
less than the amount of the stevedore's lien. Recognizing the
equitable principle that a lawyer who creates a fund for another is
entitled to compensation for his work, the court found that the at-
torney's lien had priority over the stevedore's lien. The same court
had previously held, in Fontana v. Grace Line Inc.,23 that the
stevedore's lien took priority over the attorney's lien. The Valentino
court reconciled its decision with Fontana by noting that prior to
the 1972 Amendments, the stevedore's lien should have had priority,
for to have held otherwise would have been to "charge the steve-
dore for the privilege of being sued."24 The Valentino court merely
changed the priority of liens in those situations in which the award
is insufficient to satisfy both the stevedore's and the attorney's
liens. Valentino, however, does not disturb that portion of Fontana
which asserts that when the total recovery is sufficient to satisfy
both liens, the stevedore's lien will not be diminished, and the
longshoreman will remain solely responsible for the fees of the at-
torney. 5
The fifth circuit has taken another approach, as evidenced by
Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappy Trans-Ocean." The court re-
jected any hard and fast rule which would create a "purposeless
symmetry"27 and adopted a balancing approach, designed to deter-
mine whether it is reasonable for the longshoreman to bear alone
the entire costs of the recovery. Before the stevedore would be re-
22. 552 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1977). The longshoreman recovered from the shipowner a
sum of $5,000. The stevedore had a lien in the amount of $15,488.31. Id. at 467.
23. 205 F.2d 151 (2d Cir. 1953).
24. 552 F.2d at 470.
25. Id. The second circuit, in Landon v. Lief Hoegh and Co., Inc., 521 F.2d 756,
761 (2d Cir. 1975), has referred to the longshoreman as a "statutory trustee of an ex-
press trust for the benefit of the employer." In Landon, the second circuit determined
that the stevedore should be fully compensated for his compensation payments when
the recovery exceeds the compensation lien.
26. 579 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1978).
27. Id. at 1282.
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quired to contribute a portion of the longshoreman's attorney's fees,
a determination would be made to see if the longshoreman already
had been amply reimbursed. Such an inquiry would prevent the
longshoreman from receiving an "unearned bounty."28
It is thus obvious that the courts of appeals have developed
disparate solutions to the problem arising out of the lack of congres-
sional guidance as to the proper distribution of the longshoreman's
recovery in a 905(b) action. Although the Court in Bloomer referred
to a well-settled judicial rule,29 it is submitted that no such rule ex-
isted after the 1972 Amendments.
In the instant case, the amount of the longshoreman's settlement
with the shipowner was sufficient to recompense both the attorney
and the stevedore. Relying upon the "language, structure, and his-
tory"'" of the LHWCA, the Court held that the stevedore should be
reimbursed for all of his compensation payments and that his lien
should not be reduced by a proportionate share of the long-
shoreman's attorney's fees. In its analysis the Court noted: "[Tihe
unambigious provision that the stevedore shall be reimbursed for all
of his legal expenses if he obtains the recovery does . . . speak with
considerable force against requiring him to bear a part of the
longshoreman's costs when the longshoreman recovers on his own."32
Finding no reason to believe that Congress intended a different dis-
tribution of the expenses of suit merely because the longshoreman
brought the action, the Court rejected any apportionment of such
expenses.3
Justice Marshall, writing for eight members of the Court, found
that an apportionment of attorney's fees would result in a double
recovery by the longshoreman. 4 Emphasis was placed on Congress's
failure to "alter, the uniform rule [of pre-1972 jurisprudence] that
the longshoreman's legal fees would be paid by the longshoreman
alone."3 5 In light of congressional inaction, the Court expressed a
reluctance to change that rule judicially."
The Bloomer opinion reflects an awareness of a congressional in-
28. Id. at 1278.
29. 100 S. Ct. at 931.
30. The 1972 Amendments to the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compen-
sation Act, Pub. L. No. 92-576, 86 Stat. 1251.
31. 100 S. Ct. at 927.
32. Id. at 928.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 932.




tent to eliminate the pre-1972 situation in which "much of the [steve-
dore's] financial resources which could better be utilized to pay im-
proved compensation benefits were now being spent to defray litiga-
tion costs."37 Recognizing this congressional intent to conserve the
stevedore's resources, the Court determined that an apportionment
of legal fees would be inconsistent with this intent. 8 The result was
a denial of the petitioner's assertion that the "common fund" doc-
trine required the stevedore to contribute to the expenses of litiga-
tion.
The common fund doctrine represents the proposition that one
who obtains a benefit from a lawsuit should contribute to its costs,
preventing the beneficiary from being unjustly enriched at the lit-
igant's expense. 9 Reflecting the traditional practice in courts of
equity, the Court previously has recognized that a litigant or a
lawyer who obtains a fund which benefits another should secure a
reasonable attorney's fee from the fund as a whole." According to
the Bloomer Court, the merits of the "common fund" doctrine were
outweighed by the "language, structure, and history" of the
LHWCA." The Court did not, however, discuss the merits of the
equitable "common fund" doctrine.
While perhaps placing too little emphasis on the merits of the
equitable doctrine, the Court may have overemphasized the signif-
icance of congressional inaction. The majority asserts that, had Con-
gress intended a different allocation scheme from that provided in
section 933(e),"3 Congress could have stipulated expressly its intent.
On the other hand, it can be argued with equal force that, "[hiad
Congress intended rote application of the allocation scheme in 33
U.S.C. 933(e) to recovery in a 'longshoreman initiated' action,
specification of this result would have been a simple task, and one
would have expected Congress to say so."" It is quite possible that
37. H.R. REP. No. 92-1441, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 4698, 4702.
38. 100 S. Ct. at 932.
39. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 100 S. Ct. 745, 749 (1980). See generally Dawson,
Lawyers and Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597
(1974).
40. Boeing Co. v. Van Gemert, 100 S. Ct. 745, 749 (1980). The Court discussed the
requirements necessary for an application of the "common fund" doctrine. Initially, the
class of persons benefitted by the lawsuit must be "small in number and easily iden-
tifiable." Secondly, the benefits must be capable of being traced with some accuracy,
and lastly, "there was reason for confidence that the costs (of litigation) could indeed
be shifted with some exactitude to those benefiting." Id. at 749.
41. 100 S. Ct. at 927.
42. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(e) (1978).
43. Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. at 935. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Congress chose not to deal with the allocation of the recovery when
the longshoreman brought the suit." It is certain that Congress in-
tended that the interests of all should be protected and that the
equities should be balanced. 5 It is submitted that the congressional
desire was to allow the courts to discover an equitable solution."6
This supposition finds support in the fact that the stevedore's lien
was originally a judicial creation. Courts adopted the equitable lien
as a means of preventing double recovery on the part of the long-
shoreman. 7 It can thus be suggested that Congress was aware of
the difficulties involved and chose not to adopt an inflexible
statutory rule for fear that an inequitable solution might result.
The mere fact that Congress was silent in the face of many
lower court decisions denying apportionment'4 does not prove that
Congress would accept this result under the present statutory
scheme. The decisions relied upon by the Court in its analysis of
legislative history were rendered prior to the elimination of the
Sieracki-Ryan system. Congress observed that under the Sieracki-
Ryan system, the stevedore was being held indirectly liable for
damages to the longshoreman who sued the vessel under the unsea-
worthiness doctrine. 9
44. "The legislative history relied upon by the Court ... fails to show that Con-
gress delved into the intricacies of this judicial debate, or indeed that it did more than
barely scratch the surface in consideration of fee allocations in actions brought by
longshoremen." Id. at 935, Accord, Ashcraft and Gerel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 343
F.2d 333, 337 (D.C. Cir. 1965). "lilt may well be that Congress has not anticipated these
problems or made the conscious provision for them that such anticipation might have
entailed."
45. S. REP. No. 428, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, reprinted in [19591 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2314-15. "It [the bill] carefully protects the interests of all who are involved
and balances the equities."
46. "[Clongress left the matter to the judicial process." 100 S. Ct. at 935.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See, e.g., Chouest v. A & P Boat Rentals, Inc., 472 F.2d
1026, 1035 (5th Cir. 1973). ("It is our responsibility to divide third party recoveries in
the manner we feel best accords with the purpose of the Congress in enacting the
LHCA").
47. See The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943). See also Allen v. Texaco, Inc., 510
F.2d 977 (5th Cir. 1975).
48. See, e.g., Ballwantz v. Jarka Corp. of Baltimore, 382 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967);
Haynes v. Rederi A/S Aladdin 362 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1966). Cf. Spano v. N.V. Stoom-
vaart Maatschappy, 340 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (the interest of the
longshoreman in his lawsuit against the vessel owner attaches only to the excess after
the stevedore had been reimbursed; the attorney for the longshoreman was not paid
because his lien could only attach to an excess that did not exist in the case).
49. The end result is that, despite the provision in the Act which limits an
employer's liability to the compensation and medical benefits provided in the Act,
a stevedore-employer is indirectly liable for damages to an injured longshoreman
who utilizes the technique of suing the vessel under the unseaworthiness doctrine.
[19721 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4702.
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At least one court recognized that the elimination of the
Sieracki-Ryan system necessitated a reassessment of prior juris-
prudence .denying apportionment. In 1967 the fourth circuit deter-
mined in Ballwanz v. Jarka Corp." that the stevedore should not
have to contribute to the longshoreman's attorney fees. The court
reasoned that because the shipowner may eventually sue the
stevedore, it would not be proper for the stevedore to contribute to
a recovery which would serve to expose him to further liability."
Recognizing that the longshoreman's suit against the shipowner no
longer exposed the stevedore to additional liability, the same court
in Swift v. Bolten2 held that, in light of the 1972 Amendments, the
stevedore should contribute a pro rata portion of the fees involved
in recovery.
In Ballwanz, the court dealt with a stevedore and a longshore-
man whose interests clashed. By bringing a third party suit against
the shipowner, the longshoreman was exposing the stevedore to lia-
bility beyond the scheduled compensation benefits. The opposite
situation existed, however, in the post-1972 case of Swift v. Bolten.
No longer did the longshoreman's suit expose the stevedore to added
liability; rather, both parties had a common interest in suing the
shipowner. Even the Bloomer majority recognized that "the steve-
dore and the longshoreman now have a common interest in the
longshoreman's recovery against the shipowner." 3
Despite the changes made by the 1972 Amendments, the
Bloomer Court asserted that "there is no reason to believe that Con-
gress intended a different distribution of the expenses of suit merely
because the longshoreman has brought the action."5 But at least
50. 382 F.2d 433 (4th Cir. 1967). The BaUwanz court stated that "[iln that situation
[where the stevedore and the longshoremen are adverse because the longshoreman has
sued the vessel owner who brings a third-party action against the stevedore alleging
breach of warranty of workmanlike performance], counsel for the longshoreman ought
not to have his fee measured by or payable out of any incidental credit received by the
stevedore as a result of the litigation." Id. at 437.
51. Id.
52. 517 F.2d 368 (4th Cir. 1975).
53. 100 S.Ct. at 931. But see Chouest v. A & P Boat Rentals, Inc., 472 F.2d 1026
(5th Cir. 1973). In Chouest, the court noted that:
A conflict may persist as to the extent of the injured longshoreman's disabil-
ity. Section 33(f) of the LHCA, 33 U.S.C. 933(f) (1972), permits a longshoreman to
assert a further claim for compensation after the conclusion of the third-party ac-
tion if the recovery from the third party, together with the amounts already paid
in compensation, falls short of the amount to which the longshoreman is entitled
under the LHCA.
Id. at 1032 n.8.
54. 100 S. Ct. at 928. (emphasis added).
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two reasons can be discovered for believing that Congress may have
intended a different distribution scheme in those instances in which
the longshoreman initiates the 905(b) action against the shipowner.
Under section 933(e) the stevedore is entitled to one-fifth of any ex-
cess recovery should he initiate the action.55 It was believed that "by
giving the employer a reasonable [one-fifth] share in the net
recovery an incentive is provided not to compromise a suit only for
the amount of compensation but to protect the interests of the
employee as much as possible."56 If Congress had the interests of the
longshoreman in mind when providing for the 933(e) distribution of
the stevedore's recovery, certainly the interests of the long-
shoreman should be taken into account in attempting to allocate the
longshoreman's recovery. While it is clear that the Bloomer Court
recognized the congressional intent to "assure conservation of
stevedore resources,"57 it is unclear whether any consideration was
given to the congressional desire to protect the interests of the long-
shoreman.
Secondly, it may be argued that the one who initiates the third
party action should not be saddled with extensive attorney's fees."
Because the statutory distribution scheme favors the stevedore
when he brings the third party suit, parity of reasoning suggests
that the longshoreman's expenses should be taken into consideration
when he initiates the action.
The Bloomer majority asserts that an apportionment of at-
torney's fees between the longshoreman and the stevedore would
result in a "windfall" '6 or double recovery for the longshoreman.
There is, however, no double recovery until the longshoreman has
received funds fully commensurate with his injuries. Justice
Blackmun, in his dissent, noted that
[t]he longshoreman would receive no windfall. Any costs or fees
he must pay reduce his net recovery below the amount of his ad-
judicated injuries. . . .So long as the longshoreman's total com-
55. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(e) (1978).
56. [19591 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 2135. See Atleson, Workmen's Com-
pensation: Third Party Action and the Apportionment of Attorney's Fees, 19 BUFFALO
L. REV. 515, 542 (1969).
57. 100 S. Ct. at 931.
58. 100 S. Ct. at 936 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
59. It is interesting to note that should the stevedore decline to pay compensa-
tion, thus forcing the longshoreman to retain an attorney to prosecute his claim
against the stevedore, LHWCA section 928(a) assesses reasonable legal fees against
the recalcitrant stevedore. 33 U.S.C.A. § 928(a) (1978).
60. 100 S. Ct. at 932-33.
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pensation remains less than his actual damages, there is no true
"double recovery." 1
It is important to note that compensation systems do not fully com-
pensate the victim. 2 The longshoreman is by no means made
whole. 3 The very rationale behind the compensation scheme is to
replace the uncertainty involved in an attempt to recover full
damages with a certain, albeit partial, recovery. 4 In certain cases
the longshoreman's recovery against the shipowner is less than or
barely greater than the stevedore's lien. 5 In such a situation, a
windfall will not occur if the stevedore is required to contribute to
the longshoreman's attorney's fees. Allowing contribution will
assure only that the proceeds of a successful recovery will not be
divided between the employer and the longshoreman's attorney. In
any event, it is apparent that a "windfall" does not necessarily
result when attorney's fees are shared.
The Bloomer majority refers to a "uniform rule" 7 of the courts
that the stevedore should not be required to contribute to the long-
shoreman's legal expenses. It is further implied that congressional
inaction was tantamount to congressional approval 8 of this rule.
61. 100 S. Ct. at 937 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. "The aim of workmen's compensation was to replace the occasionally exorbi-
tant and always uncertain indemnity from civil actions by a definite but limited com-
pensation scale." H. SOMERS & A. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 59 (1975). See
Atleson, supra note 56, at 518.
63. For example, the congressional record of the Longshoremen's and Harbor
Workers' Compensation Act Amendments of 1972 shows that
[tihe basic requirement of the Act is for the injured worker to receive 661/3%
of his average weekly wage .... Section 5 of the bill amends the Act to provide.
that the maximum compensation for disability shall not exceed 200%/ of the na-
tional average weekly wage to be determined annually by the Secretary of Labor.
[1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4700.
64. Poindexter, Journey Into The Twilight Zone, 4 WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION L.
REv. 495 (1977).
65. E.g. Nacirema Operating Co. v. Oosting, 456 F.2d 956 (4th Cir. 1972); Valentino
v. Rickners Rhederei, G.m.B.H., 417 F. Supp. 176 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Spano v. N.V. Stoom-
vaart Maatschappij "Nederland," 340 F. Supp. 1194 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
66. A number of state worker's compensation plans guarantee the employee a
percentage of the recovery. It is contended by some that this is merely a method of ap-
portioning attorney's fees, a disguised sharing of attorney's fees. See Atleson, supra
note 56 at 531. See also Chouest v. A & P Boat Rentals, Inc., 472 F.2d 1026 (5th Cir.
1973). The Federal Employees' Compensation Act creates'a specific guaranteed share
of a recovery fund for the employee. "Congress has indicated its own concern with pro-
viding the injured employee a reward sufficient to dispel his fears that the proceeds of
a successful recovery will be divided between the lawyer and his employer." Id. at
1035 n.14.
67. 100 S. Ct. at 931.
68. "In these circumstances it is for Congress, not this Court, to determine
whether a requirement of proportional payment of legal expenses would ultimately
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Even if congressional silence is unequivocally interpreted as con-
gressional acceptance,"9 the cases which the majority cites in sup-
port of its proposition are distinguishable."0 These cases cannot be
examined properly without a recognition that their rulings were
fashioned in an atmosphere in which the interests of the stevedore
and the longshoreman were conflicting.71 Secondly, some of the cases
address the broad question of whether or not the employer is entitled
to any reimbursement for his compensation payments."2 Lastly, the
factual situations are diverse. Certain additional facts may be in-
strumental in putting these rullings in perspective.
The Court relied partially on the cases of Miranda v. City of
Galveston" and Haynes v. Rederi A/S Aladdin4 to support the prop-
osition that Congress had accepted the judicial rule of non-appor-
tionment. In both of those cases, however, the opinions emphasized
the fact that the employer's compensation carrier had been
represented by its own counsel;" this may have influenced the deci-
sions to deny apportionment of fees. Furthermore, the fifth circuit's
opinion in Haynes explicitly recognized the equitable common fund
doctrine which had been applied by that court in Strachan Shipping
Company v. Melvin."6 The fifth circuit summarized its holdings by
stating that
benefit injured longshoremen, or instead longshoremen's lawyers, who were found to
have been the primary beneficiaries of third-party actions in the past." Id. at 932 n.ll.
69. "I feel the Court has ... overdrawn the clarity of congressional approval of it
[the rule denying apportionment]. 100 S. Ct. at 934 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. E.g., Haynes v. Rederi A/S Aladdin, 362 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1966); Ashcraft and
Gerel v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 343 F.2d 333 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Davis v. United States
Lines Co., 253 F.2d 262 (3d Cir. 1958); The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943); In re Shef-
field Tankers Corp., 222 F. Supp. 441 (N.D. Cal. 1963); Oleszcauk v. Calmar Steamship
Corp., 163 F. Supp. 370 (D. Md. 1958); Miranda v. City of Galveston, 123 F. Supp. 889
(S.D. Tex. 1954); Fontana v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 106 F. Supp. 461 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
71. See text at note 53, supra.
72. The Etna, 138 F.2d 37 (3d Cir. 1943). See Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 100
S. Ct. at 934 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
73. 123 F. Supp. 889 (S.D. Tex. 1954).
74. 362 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1966).
75. "In fact it employed its own attorney's to preserve its position during this
litigation and these counsel represented it and actively asserted its rights throughout
the trial." Haynes v. Rederi A/S Aladdin, 362 F.2d 351 (5th Cir. 1966); "Each was
represented by counsel. Information obtained by each in prior investigations and litiga-
tion was used at the trial." Miranda v. City of Galveston, 123 F. Supp. 891 (S.D. Tex.
1954). See Celia v. Partenreederei MS Ravena, 529 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1975). In this case
the insurance carrier for the stevedore specifically informed the longshoreman's at-
torney that he was not being engaged to represent the company for the recovery of
the compensation payments. Furthermore, the insurance carrier retained a firm which
monitored the proceedings for the insurance carrier. The Cella court disallowed appor-
tionment of fees.
76. 327 F.2d 83 (5th Cir. 1964).
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all share the underlying premise that, where the reimbursement
of the employer's compensation carrier is achieved through the
efforts of the plaintiffs counsel, a reasonable fee for plaintiff's
counsel may, if necessary, be levied for recovery of the compen-
sation.7
In summary, all of the cases cited by the majority pre-date the 1972
Amendments. JIn addition to this distinction, Miranda and Haynes
address a situation in which the compensation carriers employed
their own counsel. There is no indication in the instant case that the
worker's compensation carrier for Bloomer's employer employed in-
dependent counsel to secure recovery of its compensation payments.
Thus, the instant case is not squarely in line with the cases used to
support a rule of non-apportionment of attorney's fees."
A further argument used by the Bloomer Court to support a
denial of apportionment is based upon the idea that the stevedore
would thus be subject to a "new liability." 9 It certainly is not denied
that one of the motivating forces behind the 1972 Amendments was
to limit the liability of the stevedore."0 In fact, the response of Con-
gress in 1972 was in part a result of the suggestion of stevedores
that some sort of remedial congressional legislation would enable
them to pay greater compensation awards. 1 As a result of the
Amendments, the stevedore is insulated from any action for
contribution or indemnity from the shipowner." It is thus conceded
that limitation of the stevedore's liability is within the congressional
purpose in enacting the 1972 Amendments. However, the Court's
conclusion that a decision in favor of sharing attorney's fees would
create a new liability is questionable. A recovery of the compensa-
77. Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappy Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274, 1278 (5th
Cir. 1978).
78. It might be noted that while the Court refers to a longstanding judicial rule
that fees should not be apportioned, the opinion admits that "[wie granted certiorari to
resolve this recurring question on which the courts of appeals have been divided." 100
S. Ct. at 927.
79. Id. at 932.
80. "[T]here is no longer any necessity for permitting the vessel to recover the
damages for which it is liable to the injured worker from the stevedore or other
employer of the worker. . . .Accordingly, the bill expressly prohibits such recovery,
whether based on an implied or express warranty." [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS at 4704.
81. See Steinberg, supra note 5, at 659.
82. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 436. See also Edmonds v. Compagnie
Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979). In Edmonds, although the stevedore
was 70% at fault and the longshoreman was 100/o at fault, the shipowner was held
responsible for 90%/ of the damages. The longshoreman's recovery was only reduced
by his own negligence. The stevedore was not liable for any contribution or indemnity.
1981]
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tion payments does not represent a reduction of liability, but rather,
a satisfaction of that liability.83 Although a required sharing of
recovery fees would reduce the compensation fund, sharing would
not create a new liability. "To call this an increase in the carrier's
net liability . . . is merely to play with words."'" The liability of the
stevedore for compensation payments is the result of the statutorily-
created compensation system. The stevedore must pay compensa-
tion, regardless of whether he has an opportunity to be reimbursed.
To allege that a reduction of the compensation lien results in the
creation of new liability does not seem logically supportable.
Coupled with an unwillingness to create any new liability for the
stevedore, the majority enunciated a desire to "ensure conservation
of the legal expenses of stevedores and their insurers."'5 Certainly,
this is a laudable goal; but if husbanding the stevedore's resources is
an objective, then actions by longshoremen against third parties
should be encouraged. An absolute denial of any sharing of
attorney's fees would, in many instances, discourage such action."
On the contrary, a reduction of the stevedore's lien by a portion of
the expenses involved in recovery would encourage the longshore-
man to sue the allegedly negligent third party. It is only through a
third-party action, brought either by the longshoreman or the
stevedore, that the stevedore will be able to recuperate his compen-
sation payments. Thus, encouragement of these suits does not
reduce the resources of the stevedore, but rather replenishes them.
In response to the argument that proportional sharing of at-
torney's fees would assist the stevedore by encouraging the long-
shoreman to bring suit, the Court stated that the stevedore himself
was encouraged by the LHWCA to initiate the action if the long-
shoreman failed to do so. 7 However, there are situations in which a
stevedore may be hesitant to bring suit against the third party
shipowner. In Valentino v, Rickners Rhederei G.m.B.H." the court
noted that stevedores do not generally bring negligence suits
against shipowners for fear of antagonizing customer relations. Ad-
ditionally, third party actions are not likely to be pursued when the
83. See Atleson, supra note 56, at 515.
84. Id. at 545.
85. 100 S. Ct. at 932. See also Celia v. Partenreederei MS Ravenna, 529 F.2d 15-20
(1st Cir. 1975) ("We conclude that the overriding purpose of the 1972 Amendments was
to strictly limit the liability of the stevedore in order to husband its resources, and its
insurance carrier's resources, for payment of the increased benefits under the Act").
86. Brown v. American Mail Line, Ltd., 437 F. Supp. 628, 630 (D. Or. 1977). See
also Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappy Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1978).
87. 100 S. Ct. at 932 n.12.
88. 552 F.2d 466, 469 (2d Cir. 1977).
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employer's compensation carrier, subrogee to the employer's claim,
is also the liability insurer for the third party shipowner.89 In these
instances, the stevedore's only hope of recovering any part of the
compensation already paid may be through a suit initiated by the
longshoreman. In neither situation can it be said that a contribution
by the stevedore to the longshoreman's fees and court costs would
deplete the stevedore's resources. Instead, it would enable the ste-
vedore to "husband" his resources. At the same time, the longshore-
man would not be forced to pay the attorney's fees totally from his
own recovery.
In order to place the instant dispute in perspective, it might be
helpful to reconsider the overall objectives of a worker's compensa-
tion system. "Workmen's compensation represents a balanced set of
sacrifices by and gains for the worker and the employer which could
be legally enforced in the public interest."9 When worker's compen-
sation systems were first conceived, the basic idea was that each
side gave up something and gained something in return." The entire
system operates on a quid pro quo principle. The denial by the
Court of any type of sharing of the costs involved in bringing suit
seems to violate the quid pro quo philosophy underlying the
LHWCA. The Act effects a compromise between the employer and
the employee: the stevedore benefits from a limitation of his liability
to compensation payments; the employee is relieved of the risk and
uncertainty that would accompany a suit against the employer based
on negligence. While possibly less than a tort recovery, the long-
shoreman's recovery against the stevedore is, nonetheless, certain.
The 1972 Amendments can be seen as a compromise. The long-
shoreman was deprived of an action against the shipowner based on
a warranty of seaworthiness, but he is still able to bring an action in
negligence. Furthermore, the shipowner is no longer allowed to seek
contribution or indemnity from the stevedore, although the
shipowner's liability is based on fault principles instead of on the
warranty system. 2 Thus, it would not be unreasonable to conclude
89. An example of this situation can be found in Czaplicki v. The Hoegh
Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525, 530 (1956). Here, the action had been assigned, but because
of the interests involved the employer did not initiate an action against the third par-
ty. "The result is that Czaplicki's rights of action were held by the party most
likely to suffer were the rights of action to be successfully enforced." See generally
Rodriguez v. Compass Shipping Co. Ltd., 456 F. Supp. 1014, 1023 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
90. See H. SOMERS, supra note 62, at 28,
91. See G. GILMORE, supra note 8, at 401.
92. See Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
Congress envisioned the liability under the warranty system as a form of absolute
liability. [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4703.
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that when the stevedore recovers his compensation payments, he
should have to contribute to the expenses involved in the recovery.
If the stevedore is reimbursed without having to sue the third party
himself and without having to contribute to the longshoreman's ex-
penses, there is no quid pro quo. 3
Because the solution to the question of sharing recovery ex-
penses should be consistent with congressional intent, the purposes
of the 1972 Amendments should be considered. The protection of the
longshoreman was one of the goals sought." Secondly, the Act was
designed to encourage negligence actions. By permitting those ac-
tions, Congress sought to encourage safety.95 The legislative history
of the 1972 Amendments reveals a strong desire to assure that neg-
ligence actions remain viable and that the vessel owners and other
persons are held to their obligations and duties under the Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Act of 1970."
Thus, the longshoreman's right to sue the shipowner for negli-
gence should be encouraged and protected. However, the long-
shoreman may be discouraged from pursuing the very actions which
the Act seeks to promote when he is the last one to receive any
benefit therefrom. Regardless of who brings the suit, the long-
shoreman is relegated to a status well behind the stevedore and, in
some cases, behind his attorney.9 7 If the stevedore initiates the suit,
he deducts his compensation payments and his costs, which include
reasonable attorney's fees. The stevedore also gets one-fifth of the
93. See Atleson, supra note 56, at 539. Many states have found it unfair for there
to be no apportionment of fees. "The objection is probably not so much that the
employee may find himself with nothing, but rather that the insurer receives reim-
bursement without the outlay of attorney's fees." Id. (emphasis in original). In other
words, the stevedore gets something for nothing.
94. "[W]e find nothing to indicate and should not presume that Congress intended
to place the burden of the inequity on the longshoreman whom the Act seeks to pro-
tect." Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256, 270 (1979).
95. Permitting actions against the vessel based on negligence will meet the object-
ive of encouraging safety because the vessel will still be required to exercise the
same care as a land based person in providing a safe place to work. Thus, nothing
in this bill is intended to derogate from the vessel's responsibility to take ap-
propriate corrective action where it knows or should have known about a
dangerous condition.
11972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 4704.
96. Id at 4705. See Robertson, supra note 11, at 456.
97. Valentino v. Rickners Rhederei, G.m.B.H., 552 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1977). In this
case the recovery was not sufficient to cover both the stevedore's lien and the at-
torney's fees. The court held that the attorney's lien had priority over the stevedore's.
Compare this result with Justice Blackmun's dissenting view in Bloomer. Bloomer v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. 100 S. Ct. at 933 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun stated that the welfare of longshoremen is relegated to secondary status.
His status is secondary to that of the stevedore.
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excess. This bonus is given to encourage the stevedore to bring suit
if the longshoreman does not do so. The longshoreman is entitled to
four-fifths of the sum that remains after the reduction of the steve-
dore's compensation lien and expenses. 8 According to the Bloomer
decision, the longshoreman is the last in line even when he initiates
the action. The stevedore must be reimbursed, and in at least one
circuit, the attorney's fees will already have been deducted. 9
Even when the longshoreman himself is not discouraged from
suing the third party, the plaintiff's bar may be reluctant to handle
his suit;' 9 most notably, there may be situations in which the at-
torney's lien does not have priority and the recovery is not suffi-
cient to cover both the stevedore's lien and the attorney's fees.''
The action will not be initiated unless the attorney is certain of a
sufficient recovery. This is especially true today, when the recovery
against the shipowner is based on ordinary negligence principles in-
stead of upon the Sieracki warranty of seaworthiness, which did not
require proof of fault. The greater preparation required for a suc-
cessful 905(b) action will thus make the attorney even more reluc-
tant to accept this type of case if he is not assured of being compen-
sated fully. Furthermore, "in many cases . . . an attorney cannot
justly charge the longshoreman a percentage of the gross recovery
because the plaintiff's low net recovery would make such a result
unconscionable."'' ° In short, third party actions may be discouraged.
If the longshoreman fails to sue the third party, it is possible
that no action will be brought. The stevedore may not want to in-
itiate the action for business reasons. Thus, the allegedly negligent
third party would be relieved of liability. The compensation system
would be forced to absorb all of the loss, and the shipowner would
not be encouraged to promote safety.
Besides having a potential for discouraging third party actions,
the Court's holding results in a windfall to the stevedore. If the
98. 33 U.S.C.A. § 933(e) (1978).
99. Valentino v. Rickners Rhederei, G.m.B.H., 552 F.2d 466 (2d Cir. 1977). In
Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. 925, 932 n.13 (1980), the Court suggests
that the attorney's lien will have priority: "We do not today address the Valentino
situation, and contrary to the implication of the dissent, nothing in our decision sug-
gests that the stevedore's lien has priority over the longshoreman's expenses."
100. Gorman, The Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation
Act-After the 1972 Amendments, 6 J. MAR. L. & Com. 1, 26 (1974).
101. The Court fails to state what the result would be in this situation (one in
which the recovery is insufficient to cover both the attorney's and the stevedore's
lien). Justice Blackmun's dissent states that "it is to be hoped that the injured
longshoreman will not be required to disgorge part of his compensation payment." 100
S. Ct. at 937 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
102. Mitchell v. Scheepvaart Maatschappy Trans-Ocean, 579 F.2d 1274, 1279 (5th
Cir. 1978).
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stevedore brings the action, he is entitled to one-fifth of the excess
after reimbursement of his lien and payment of his costs. The one-
fifth excess is given as an incentive to the stevedore not to settle
merely for his compensation payments and is designed for the pro-
tection of the longshoreman. However, the one-fifth excess certainly
can be seen as a windfall to the stevedore. Thus, even if the require-
ment of proportional sharing could be seen as a burden on the steve-
dore, this burden could serve only to counterbalance the windfall
that the stevedore receives if he brings the action.0 3 When the
longshoreman initiates the suit, the stevedore still receives a wind-
fall because he recovers his compensation lien without any expense
or inconvenience. An even greater inequity results if the longshore-
man brings the suit and the stevedore was partially at fault. The
longshoreman may recover the full extent of his damages from the
shipowner, such recovery being neither barred nor reduced by the
negligence of his employer."°4 According to the instant decision, the
stevedore will, despite his negligence, be reimbursed fully for his
compensation payments, without having to contribute to the ex-
penses of the longshoreman's recovery.
The instant decision, which denied sharing of the expenses of
recovery, may serve to deter use of the 905(b) action, to discourage
the plaintiff's bar from representing 905(b) claimants, and to encour-
age the use of fee arrangements between the longshoreman's attor-
ney and the stevedore. °5 The Bloomer decision may, by discouraging
905(b) actions, "increase the burden upon the public as a whole
where the compensation benefits are in fact inadequate to care for
the worker and his family." '°
The Court does not deal with the situation in which the
recovery is insufficient to cover both the longshoreman's attorney
fees and the stevedore's lien."7 If the attorney is not compensated,
the contingent fee system will be discouraged. As stated in Valen-
tino v. Rickners Rhederei, G.m.B.H., a denial of legal fees from the
stevedore's recovery may reduce the number of suits, but the fact of
overcrowded court dockets is not a good reason for a rule which
would close the courts to many longshoremen by reducing the value
of the contingent fee system.'
The problem of apportionment of attorney's fees could have
been addressed in several ways. The Court could have adopted the
103. Atleson, supra note 56, at 542.
104. Edmonds v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 443 U.S. 256 (1979).
105. Gorman, supra note 100.
106. Atleson, supra note 56, at 520.
107. See note 99, supra.
108. 417 F. Supp. at 181.
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"balancing formula" of the Mitchell court or the "pro rata" approach
of the fourth circuit. Perhaps the "balancing approach" would be the
most equitable; Mitchell states:
Our concern rather is whether the plaintiff justly can be asked
to bear alone a reasonable fee for his total recovery: when he
cannot, the size of the gross recovery is only one factor to con-
sider in determining the appropriateness of requiring the com-
pensation lienor to contribute to a reasonable fee for plaintiff's
counsel." 9
The equities should be balanced. As stated by Edmonds v. Com-
pagnie Generale Transatlantique,"° there is nothing to indicate that
Congress intended that the burden of the inequity rest on the long-
shoreman. It is interesting to note that a growing number of state
compensation systems do apportion attorney's fees.' It may be con-
tended that statutory reform is needed instead of judicial in-
terference. " 2 However, a statutory formula would not be as flexible
as an ad hoc determination by the court as to whether or not appor-
tionment would be the most equitable solution in a particular case.
It is rather ironic that the Court is now hesitant to fashion an
equitable remedy without specific authorization by Congress"' when
the earlier Sieracki and Ryan cases "effectively nullified the ex-
clusive liability provisions of the compensation act."" Although
judicial activism may be unappealing, the fact is that the Supreme
Court has been very active in the field of maritime law. Especially
in the absence of a specific statutory mandate, the Court should be
able to fashion the most equitable solution. The Court's decision in
Bloomer provides the stevedore with a windfall and leaves the
longshoreman with the burden of an inequitable result.
Marlene Maria Krousel
109. 579 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1978).
110. 443 U.S. 256, 270 (1979).
111. Atleson, supra note 56, at 527.
112. Steinberg, supra note 5, at 685-86. This article suggests that judicial restraint
would be the proper approach to the 1972 Amendments. The problems involve intri-
cate policy decisions which the writer of the article believes should best be dealt with
by the legislative branch.
113. Bloomer v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 100 S. Ct. 925, 932 n.il (1980): "In these cir-
cumstances it is for Congress, not this Court, to determine whether a requirement of
proportional payment of legal expenses would ultimately benefit injured longshoremen,
or instead longshoremen's lawyers, who were found to have been the primary
beneficiaries of third-party actions in the past."
114. G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 8 at 448. The writers of the cited text
believe that judicial activism in the field of maritime law is increasing: "The Supreme
Court seems to have decided to carry out experiments in such reform in the field of
maritime law, perhaps because the peculiar constitutional background lends itself to an
unusual degree of judicial activism."
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